Value Modernisation in Central and Eastern European Countries : How Does Inglehart's Theory Work? by Chromková Manea Beatrice Elena & Rabušic Ladislav
699
Articles
© sociologický ústav AV Čr, v. v. i., Praha 2020
Value Modernisation in Central  
and Eastern European Countries:  
How Does Inglehart’s Theory Work?*
BEaTRICE CHRoMkoVá ManEa and LaDISLaV RaBušIC**
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno
abstract: An intergenerational shift from more pro-family norms to individu-
al-choice norms has been taking place since the 1980s. Conditions of economic 
and social security positively contributed to this shift especially in high-in-
come countries. In this paper, we study the modernisation change on value 
structures in selected Central and Eastern European countries and compare 
them with Western European ones and look at the generational differences. 
We first check whether the value shift is moving in the assumed direction 
and whether it is copying trends observed in Western European countries. We 
then look at different generations to determine whether the younger genera-
tions in CEE countries that grew up after 1989, in a time of rapid economic and 
political change, show higher levels of post-materialist and post-modern val-
ues than the generations socialised and raised during the communist regime. 
We use data collected by the international repeated cross-sectional European 
Values Study (EVS). The results are not clear-cut on whether socioeconomic 
modernisation has led to higher shares of post-materialism, more gender-
egalitarian attitudes, and stronger support for individual-choice norms in 
CEE countries. In all the spheres of cultural modernisation analysed we found 
differences in values and attitudes between generations: the older generations 
were always more traditional than the younger generations. This was not just 
true in the CEE countries, as the same trend was recorded in the Western 
European countries. 
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Introduction
It has now been more than thirty years since the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe experienced the fall of communism in 1989, an event that launched a 
profound political, economic, and social transformation. Many citizens of these 
countries expected, after the collapse of the totalitarian regime, that their ‘back-
ward’ societies would quickly embark on a path of modernisation and undergo 
rapid social changes that would bring about, in a relatively short time, primar-
ily an improvement in living standards, but also a whole range of opportunities 
for free individual development. They were somewhat naive in this expectation, 
as social change, unlike political and economic changes, happens over the long 
term, requiring decades. Indeed, social change is strongly conditioned by chang-
ing values  and value preferences. These are known to have considerable inertia, 
as people’s basic value structures and preferences are shaped during their forma-
tive years, approximately between the ages of 10 and 25. Once established, values 
and value preferences are part of a person’s psychological structure and thus 
relatively resistant to change. 
Nonetheless, the inertia of value structures does not mean that social (and 
cultural) change is not possible. It is possible, but it is mostly gradual, adaptive, 
and happens more ‘through intergenerational population replacement than by 
the conversion of already socialized adults’ [Inglehart 1997: 19]. Essential in this 
adaptation process is that new life strategies are more likely to be adopted by 
young population groups than by older ones [Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 23]. In 
this context, Abramson and Inglehart [1992] talk about generational replacement 
to describe how, in the process of modernisation, which generates feelings of rela-
tively high economic and existential security, younger birth cohorts (generations)1 
experience different existential conditions from the ones that shaped the older 
generations. Therefore, the value preferences of older and younger generations 
usually differ.
According to Inglehart and Welzel’s [2005] understanding of modernisation, 
a society’s values are closely correlated with its level of economic development, 
but are also linked to its cultural legacy. Therefore, as Inglehart and Baker [2000] 
maintain, cultural change is path-dependent.2 Although economic development 
1 The term ‘cohort’ denotes a set of individuals who experienced some crucial stages of 
life at approximately the same time, such as marriage, school graduation, war, economic 
shifts. They are approximately the same age and share similar ideas, problems, and atti-
tudes. In other words, they share similar cultural experiences. Social science also uses the 
term ‘generation’ (‘social generation’) in this sense. Demography uses the more accurate 
term ‘birth cohort’, meaning people born in the same time interval (e.g. 1946-1950, 1951-
1954). 
2 The same notion can be found elsewhere. For instance, Eisenstadt [2000: 2], in his analy-
sis of the development of modernity, says that institutional and ideological patterns were 




tends to bring pervasive cultural changes, the fact that society has been histori-
cally shaped by different cultural phenomena has enduring effects on its develop-
ment. Cultural heritage and its norms continue to shape values, but because of 
generational replacement their impact may vary for different generations. 
In Inglehart’s conceptualisations [1971, 1977], one of the first recorded signs 
of a value change in the modernisation of advanced societies was a shift from 
materialist values, favouring economic and social security, to post-materialist val-
ues, favouring individual autonomy and self-expression. This culture shift in ad-
vanced industrial societies [Inglehart 1990] is, however, ‘just one component of an 
even broader shift from traditional to secular-rational values and from survival 
values to self-expression values that is transforming prevailing norms concerning 
religion, gender, and tolerance of out groups’ [Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart 
2017: 1317]. It is manifested as a declining respect for authority, an increasing em-
phasis on subjective well-being, increased sensitivity to environmental quality 
of life, greater choice in the areas of family arrangements and sexual norms, and 
increasing emphasis on gender equity. 
In this paper, we study the effects of modernisation and intergeneration-
al population change on value structures as outlined by Inglehart and his col-
leagues in selected countries in Europe. We focus first on materialist/post-mate-
rialist values; we then pursue values indicating gender equality; and finally we 
track individual-choice norms. We compare five Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Ro-
mania) with four Western European countries (Austria, France, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden). We first check whether the value shift goes in the assumed direc-
tion and whether it copies trends of Western European countries. We then look 
at whether there are any differences between generations. In other words, we 
shall check whether the younger generations of CEE countries that grew up after 
1989, during times of rapid economic and political changes, show higher levels 
of post-materialist and post-modern values than the generations socialised and 
raised during the communist regime. In this endeavour, we make use of the data 
collected by the international repeated cross-sectional European Values Study 
(EVS). Our paper is descriptive and exploratory.3
3 We are not aiming here to explicitly check whether possible generational differences are 
due to intergenerational replacement or historical period influence, as such an analysis 
(based on regression models) would require an integrated all-waves and countries dataset. 
There are two reasons why we do not explicitly explore generational differences. The first 
reason is that no such dataset had been released by the time of writing this paper. So far, 
there is a separate integrated data file for the 1991–2008, and an integrated data file for the 
2017 wave (we worked with the 2nd release, selected countries). One can argue that we 
could have integrated these two data files for the purpose of our analysis. We decided not 
to do so as much would need to be done in order to harmonise the two datasets and errors 
and differences between our and the official version of the dataset could appear. However, 
we plan to run such an analysis for a future paper as soon as the integrated all-waves 
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The article is organised as follows. First, we briefly discuss theories dealing 
with issues of value modernisation/post-modernisation. Then, we explain the 
choice of countries that are compared in our analysis. We introduce our data and 
methods and then go on to present the main descriptive results for our variables 
and show how each analysed value indicator varies by generation and by coun-
try. We close with a discussion of the empirical results. 
Theoretical background and past research
The focus of our paper is whether, in line with the theory of modernisation/
post-modernisation, we find value shifts among CEE countries after 1990 that are 
more or less similar to those observed in Western European countries since the 
1970s. 
Post-materialism and individualisation
Ronald Inglehart introduced and expanded the concept of post-materialist val-
ues [see Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990, 1997, 2018]. He has discussed it in connection 
with cultural changes and reflexive modernisation. According to Inglehart, the 
ranking of human values  reflects the socioeconomic conditions in which peo-
ple have been raised; he terms this observation the ‘scarcity hypothesis’.4 People 
who grew up during the First World War or during the Great Depression were 
more concerned about materialistic values  related to security and well-being. The 
generations that were socialised after the Second World War were more likely to 
emphasise post-materialist values  in various aspects of the quality of life, such as 
social justice or social tolerance. This is the effect of the ‘socialisation hypothesis’.5 
and countries dataset is released. That would allow us to better check the generational 
replacement assumption. Apart from data availability, we also had to take into account 
an analytical strategy that initially considered an APC analysis, which would allow us 
to simultaneously determine the effect of age, period and cohort. Aware of the pitfalls of 
using the APC analysis (as the effects of age, period, and cohort are linearly related) we 
considered working with an adjusted APC analysis model, like that proposed by Yang and 
Land [2008] – HAPC - that would partially eliminate the effect of the APC dependency. 
However, this method has a limitation that stems from the number of periods required for 
such an analysis. In our case, we have only four periods of measurement and it makes little 
sense to use HAPC with such a small number of periods. 
4 ‘An individual’s priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the great-
est subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.’ [Inglehart 1981: 881]
5 ‘The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of 
immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for, to a large extent, one’s basic 




When generation change occurs, post-materialist values  are predicted to become 
the norm. Inglehart talks about the transformation of societies from ‘traditional’ 
to ‘modern’ (materialistic) and ‘post-modern’ (post-materialistic).
We are aware of the fact that Inglehart’s post-materialist values and mod-
ernisation theory has generated criticism since it was introduced.6 Critics of 
the theory can be grouped into two major categories: the first line of criticism 
concerns whether modernisation and value changes have really occurred and 
whether they have occurred at the same pace; the second thread is focused on 
methodological and measurement issues relating to the way in which values are 
operationalised and measured. Rokeach [1973] was one of the first to criticise 
Inglehart’s work by pointing to the ‘ahistorical’ character of Inglehart’s theory. 
He argues that ‘ … the equality-freedom orientation underlying the ideologies 
or political orientations selected for study here, it may be argued, can surely not 
be generalized to ideologies that prevailed a thousand years ago or to those that 
might prevail a thousand years hence’ [ibid.: 186]. On the other hand, Flanagan 
[1980, 1982] and Flanagan and Lee [2003] focus their criticism on methodological 
and measurement issues. Flanagan uses various survey data and analytical strat-
egies to show the drawbacks of modernisation theory as developed and tested 
by Inglehart. Inglehart [1982] has responded to this criticism and tried to refute 
Flanagan’s arguments. Van Deth [1983] is another scholar who raises measure-
ment issues in the discussion of Inglehart’s theory, criticising Inglehart’s choice 
of items and time unreliability in response. Also, Hadenius and Teorell [2005] 
claim that there is no clear-cut distinction between correlation and casual effects 
in Inglehart and Wetzel’s model. 
The role of socialisation in shaping values is one of the main elements of In-
glehart’s modernisation theory. This aspect did not escape the critics either. Duch 
and Taylor [1993, 1994] tried to prove that socialisation and economic hardship 
during the socialisation period do not play as great a role in shaping values as In-
glehart argued in his theory. Education, in their opinion, is the main determinant 
of value change. Inglehart and his colleague Abramson [1994] has responded to 
this criticism by arguing that Duch and Taylor do not work with cohorts that were 
born before the Second World War or were socialised and lived close to or during 
that time and could have experienced economic and social hardship. 
Savelyev [2016] confirmed some of Inglehart’s assumptions relating to so-
cialisation and economic and population development. He proved that ‘the ob-
6 One of the authors of this article published an article for Czech readers already in 2000, 
in which he criticised the method of measuring post-materialism and in which he sum-
marised the fundamental methodological criticism of international scholars [see Rabušic 
2000]. Datler, Jagodzinski and Schmidt [2013: 908], who tested the validity of Inglehart’s 
theories, maintain as far as the post-materialist index is concerned that ‘the discussion of 
the index would fill a whole methodological textbook of insightful criticism and intriguing 
counterarguments’.
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served change in materialist values towards post-materialist in either West Eu-
ropean or post-socialist societies is entirely due to demographic turnover with 
control for education was not confirmed’ [ibid.: 283]. He also demonstrated that 
the spread and intensity of post-materialist and materialist values in Western and 
Central European European countries is determined by both cohort replacement 
and the within-cohort component effect. 
Haller [2002: 152] points to three major critical issues relating to Inglehart’s 
theory of modernisation: ‘the relevance of theoretical assumptions; the problem 
of the definition and measurement of concepts; and the distinction between dif-
ferent levels of aggregation and analysis’. One of the main methodological prob-
lems he draws attention to is the misleading assumption that the aggregate-level 
effects are also found at the individual level. 
Despite these criticisms, we have decided to reflect on Inglehart’s work and 
to a certain extent use in our analyses the same procedures that Inglehart and his 
co-authors did in their work. We believe that results obtained in this way can have 
their own cognitive relevance and that they will allow us to assess whether the 
value trajectories that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have followed 
over the past 25 years and continue to follow are similar to those in Western Eu-
rope countries. Datler, Jagodzinski and Schmidt [2013: 922], after all, concluded at 
the end of their critical analysis of Inglehart‘s methodology that ‘owing to Ronald 
Inglehart we have an important theory of value change which helps us to under-
stand the ongoing changes in attitudes and behavior in the west and east. His 
theory makes relatively clear predictions about what will happen in countries 
like China or India if the economic growth should continue’. 
Gender and gender roles 
Modernisation theory assumes that the perception of gender roles will change 
in the process of modernisation. Inglehart and Norris [2003: 10] argue that ‘hu-
man development brings changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality in 
virtually any society that experiences the various forms of modernization linked 
with economic development’. The causes are well known: the level of women’s 
education in Western European countries increased significantly in the second 
half of the 20th century; women also became increasingly involved in the paid 
labour market. This made women more economically and socially independent, 
which had a profound impact on their identity and life goals: unlike previous 
generations, marriage and procreation are not key points in their adult life.7 The 
7 In this context, demographers talk about a second demographic transition, which has 
manifested as increasing unmarried cohabitation, a deep drop in marriage and fertility 
rates, and a rise in divorce rates. 
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traditional family model has changed from male breadwinner to dual-earning 
model. In the sphere of values, a systematic shift from traditional values towards 
more egalitarian gender roles has been observed.
The modernisation process had a different effect on gender roles in the for-
mer communist countries than in the West. The role of women and their equal po-
sition were among the most important elements of communist ideology. Since the 
broadly-based economy and the development of its industries in these countries 
needed a sizeable labour force, women helped fill this need in the second half of 
the 20th century. The female employment rate was (and still is) relatively high. 
Women also studied in larger numbers at high schools, so the share of women 
with a complete secondary education gradually increased. Despite these struc-
tural modernisation factors, however, the roles of women in everyday life did not 
change much, and the male breadwinner model persisted: the man earned mon-
ey, and the woman, in addition to having a full-time job, still took full care of the 
household and children; this has been called the women’s double-shift model. 
Marriage was the predominant form of partnership. Thus, despite modernising 
structural factors at the societal level, the perception of gender roles remained 
traditional in the communist countries. 
In the 1990s, following the political and economic changes and the expan-
sion of tertiary education in CEE countries, the high levels of women’s educa-
tion and high employment rates started to change the gender climate. Feminist 
influences and patterns from Western countries significantly contributed to this. 
Women were more widely heard in society, and gender roles and gender equity 
increasingly became part of the media discourse.
Individual-choice norms 
In the theory of modernisation, the modernisation process goes hand in hand 
with the lesser influence of various institutions on the formation of individual 
norms, attitudes, and values. Therefore, in a (post)modern society in which indi-
vidual freedom and decision-making are highly appreciated values, the justifica-
tion for a certain behaviour may differ from the traditional justification. Thus, 
according to the theory of modernisation, people in post-modern societies can 
decide for themselves – without any social pressure – whether they approve of, 
for instance, abortion, homosexuality, divorce, or casual sex. Further, Inglehart, 
Ponarin and Inglehart [2017: 1314] hypothesise that the members of high-income 
societies experience an intergenerational shift from ‘pro-fertility norms’ (em-
phasising traditional gender roles and stigmatising any sexual behaviour not 
connected with reproduction) to ‘individual-choice norms’ (supporting gender 
equality and tolerance of non-traditional behaviour such as homosexuality) – and 
that this shift is currently occurring with exceptional speed and transforming the 
politics of gender and sexual orientation in high-income societies. 
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Generations and generational differences in values 
One of the main assumptions of modernisation theory is that the profound trans-
formation of value structures and value preferences is a process in which im-
portant roles are played by the level of socioeconomic development and by a 
country’s cultural legacy and its norms. Since every society is made up of a set of 
different generations that have been socialised in different socioeconomic condi-
tions and different cultural milieus during their formative years, it is obvious that 
in times of dynamic social change the generational composition of the population 
will influence the perception of existing social norms and the attitudes towards 
these norms. As social change (modernisation) progresses, new value preferenc-
es – stemming from generational replacement – will prevail, while the original 
ones will fade away with the outgoing generations.
In the current literature, the contemporary living population is divided 
into four birth cohorts: veterans, baby boomers, Generation X, and Generation 
Y. These cohorts share a birth time as well as common traits that come from the 
significant life events that they have experienced in common and that shape their 
values. Individuals born between 1900 and 1945 are referred to as ‘veterans’. The 
group of ‘baby boomers’ is defined as those born between 1946 and 1959. ‘Gen-
eration X’ are people born between 1960 and 1980. ‘Generation Y’ (also called 
Millennials) are people born between 1981 and 2000 [Hernaus and Pološki Vokić 
2014].8 It is assumed that the characteristics of members in each group influence 
the way they view the world – social relationships, the family, work ethic, and be-
haviour – as well as their motivations, communication preferences, and how they 
manage change [e.g. Kupperschmidt 2000; Domeyer 2006; Durkin 2007; Glass 
2007; Cates 2010; Venus 2011]. 
Veterans (also known as the silent generation) were shaped by both world 
wars and the Great Depression in the 1930s. They were born between 1900 and 
1945. The wars and crisis events formed their beliefs. They place great emphasis 
on family values  and they tended to stay in one job throughout their working life 
[PrincetonOne 2013].
Baby boomers (born 1946 to 1959) are named after the period of new pros-
perity that followed the Second World War, when the worldwide baby boom oc-
curred. Western baby boomers created the ‘hippie’ culture in which, among other 
things, new norms of partnership and sexuality were formed. This generation 
brought about the protests of 1968. Eastern European baby boomers were born in 
the time of radical political and economic change from capitalism and democracy 
to communism and totalitarianism, during which communists seized power and 
nationalised private enterprises and companies. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
8 The next generation is called ‘Generation Z’ (people born after year 2000). Since it is a 
value-evolving generation still in its formative period, we do not consider this generation 
in our paper. 
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Yugoslavia had protests, mainly against the lack of freedom of speech and the 
violation of civil rights. 
Generation X is represented by those born between 1960 and 1980. They are 
also called the ‘Divorce Generation’ and the ‘Slacker Generation’ [e.g. Hernaus 
and Pološki Vokić 2014]. Its members have borne the full weight of the second 
demographic transition, characterised by a decrease in nuptiality and an increase 
in unmarried cohabitation, a decrease in fertility and an increase in divorce. In 
CEE countries, on the other hand, this generation brought about the collapse of 
the communist regimes [PrincetonOne 2013]. Members of this generation experi-
enced in full the dismantling of communism and its economic system. 
Generation Y (Millennials) is represented by people born between 1981 and 
2000. Generations X and Y differ culturally and especially in the timing of differ-
ent stages/phases of life. They seem to have very different priorities and needs 
[Hernaus and Pološki Vokić 2014]. Generation Y grew up in a time of globalisa-
tion and the internet and in CEE countries were also the first to grow up in a time 
of freedom compared to previous recent generations. So far, this generation is rel-
atively the most educated and technically proficient. Its members were brought 
up as self-confident individuals who place high demands on themselves and oth-
ers. This may have to do with their postponement of life events at the family level 
(childbearing, marriage/partnership) and a later entry into the labour market. 
Country context
The main aim of our paper is to compare the development of value preferences in 
CEE countries in the context of the modernisation developments that took place 
after 1990. In order to have a more complete picture of the development of these 
values, we compare developments in CEE countries with those in Western coun-
tries. As our analysis is based on data from international quantitative research, 
at the time of writing this article we were somewhat limited in the country selec-
tion by data availability. We needed countries for which we had research data 
covering the required period, from 1991 to 2017.9 For this reason, we chose the 
Czech Republic,, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania as the proxies for CEE 
countries. For the Western countries, we chose Sweden, the Netherlands, France, 
and Austria because we have the necessary data and because they represent two 
different types of welfare regimes as conceptualised by Esping-Andersen [1990].10 
9 The reasons we work with the period from 1991 to 2017 are explained in the next part of 
the text. 
10 Sweden is a proxy for the Nordic regime (or the social democratic welfare-state regime). 
In this type of welfare regime public benefits are instituted as social rights and thus so-
cial insurance is universal, egalitarian, and relatively generous. This system emphasises 
maximising labour force participation and promotes gender equality and a large degree 
of income redistribution. France, the Netherlands, and Austria are proxies for a conserva-
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Given the way we conducted our exploratory analyses, we decided to limit the 
number of countries being compared. The Western countries we chose represent 
economically and culturally advanced societies, in which the process of post-
modernisation is at a high level.11 
Since 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been going 
through an intensive process of modernisation and their level of economic de-
velopment and the standard of living of their inhabitants have been gradually in-
creasing. However, the selected CEE countries were quite varied at the beginning 
of their modernisation process (after 1990): not only did they differ in their level 
of socioeconomic development (especially in their industrialisation levels), they 
also varied by the pace of modernisation they experienced (for an illustration of 
this, see Tables 1 and 2).
tive corporatist regime. This model encourages family-based assistance; the main mode 
of social assistance is based on the principal of subsidiarity. Corporations play a decisive 
role in social assistance by means of their various social insurance funds (old-age pen-
sion, health, unemployment, accident insurance). Social insurance therefore excludes non-
working spouses. Family benefits tend to encourage motherhood. One could ask why we 
have not worked with Germany as Germany is regarded as the typical example (according 
to Esping-Andersen) of a corporatist welfare regime. The answer would be that Germany 
is a country where the distinction between former West and East Germany is still in many 
aspects present. For the clarity of our analyses we would have to distinguish between the 
two, which would increase the number of countries. For the same reason we have omitted 
Italy and Spain, which have a conservative welfare regime (but are sometimes referred to 
having the Mediterranean regime). The third welfare regime, the liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) 
model, is typical for the United Kingdom. Given its specificity and proximity to our CEE 
countries, we decided to exclude the UK from our analysis. 
11 An anonymous reviewer asked us what the comparison would have been like if other 
countries had been chosen. This is, of course, a very good question and we hope we shall 
be able to answer it in a future paper based on a fully integrated dataset for all waves and 
countries.
Table 1.  GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars) in CEE and Western 
countries in 1991 and 2017 (countries sorted by GDP in 1991)
 1991 2017  1991 2017
Czech Rep. 11 592 38 489 Netherlands 21 732 55 347
Slovakia 7 163* 30 907 Austria 20 110 54 637
Poland 5 913 30 152 Sweden 20 694 52 739
Hungary 8 310 29 529 France 18 304 44 826
Romania 4 786 27 191
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/. 
Note: * Reference year = 1992.
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In 1991 Czechia had the highest economic performance among CEE coun-
tries, as measured here by GDP in PPP, followed by Hungary and Slovakia (see 
Table 1). Over the next 25 years the situation changed. The Czech Republic still 
had the highest level of economic performance in 2017, followed by Slovakia and 
Poland. Hungary and Romania had the slowest paces of economic development 
and also the lowest GDP among the countries analysed here. Although these 
countries increased their GDP from 1991 to 2017 several times over, they are still 
quite behind the selected Western countries.12
CEE countries also differed by level of human development (see Table 2). 
In 1991 Slovakia (43) and the Czech Republic (40) ranked highest on the Human 
Development Index among CEE countries; in 2018 the highest rank among CEE 
countries was occupied by the Czech Republic (which was on a level similar to 
France) and Poland.13 The difference between CEE and Western countries is not 
as great for this indicator as it is for GDP.
CEE countries also differed culturally in 1991, especially in the rate of re-
ligiosity (the populations of Romania, Poland, and Slovakia were the most reli-
gious; the Czech and Hungarian populations were the least so). There were also 
differences in the rate of gender equality, although it was relatively high in the 
public sphere in all CEE countries: this is a legacy of the communist regimes, in 
which gender equality was one of the (ideological) goals. Women were highly 
integrated in the labour market and they had universal access to education.14 On 
12 However, we should bear in mind that these countries are among the most developed 
ones in the world. 
13 The cut-off points are an HDI of less than 0.550 for low human development, 0.550–0.699 
for medium human development, 0.700–0.799 for high human development, and 0.800 or 
greater for very high human development. From this point of view, the CEE countries in 
1991 had high human development (except for Romania, which had low human develop-
ment). In 2018, all the CEE countries had very high human development.
14 According to some scholars, CEE countries ‘were in some dimensions forerunners in 
Table 2.  Human Development Index (rank in brackets) in CEE and Western countries 
in 1991 and 2017
 1991 2017  1991 2017
Slovakia 0.734 [34] 0.854 [37] Netherlands 0.834 [5] 0.932 [10]
Czech Rep. 0.726 [40] 0.888 [27] Sweden 0.818 [9] 0.935 [8]
Poland 0.711 [45] 0.868 [33] Austria 0.799 [16] 0.912 [20]
Hungary 0.702 [48] 0.841 [44] France 0.790 [18] 0.890 [27]
Romania 0.686 [54] 0.813 [55]
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#.
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the other hand, it was still primarily women who were doing the child-rearing 
and household chores. Although gender equality was vehemently emphasised 
rhetorically, everyday reality was quite different.
Data and methods
The source of our data is the European Values Study (EVS), which is a large inter-
national comparative longitudinal survey that measures the indicators of value 
change/consistency in Europe.15 It has been carried out four times in many Eu-
ropean countries: in 1991, 1999, 2008, and 2017. The data are well suited to our 
purpose because the survey’s time series runs from 1991 to 2017, so we are able 
to follow the progress of the modernisation process over that period. In the CEE 
countries, 1991 can be seen as a certain base line, as the attitudes and values cap-
tured in this EVS wave represent value structures that more or less correspond to 
the value climate of the preceding communist society. In the subsequent waves 
(1999, 2008, and 2017), the degree of modernisation should become more visible.
The EVS uses a standardised questionnaire that covers a wide variety of 
topics,16 including perceptions of life, gender roles, the family, religion, politics 
and society, national identity, and the environment. Questionnaire items make 
it possible to follow indicators that, according to Inglehart [1997] and Inglehart 
and Welzel [2005], are at the core of the modernisation process. In each country, 
a random probability sample scheme is used, and the sample is representative of 
the population aged 18 and older.17 The dataset was provided by the Data Archive 
for Social Sciences (DAS) of the GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences; 
data for 2017 come from the second release . 
Our article is based on the central claim of Inglehart’s modernisation theory 
that ‘economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predict-
able changes in culture and social and political life’ [Inglehart and Baker 2000: 
21]. It is also based on results by Inglehart [1977, 1990, 1997] and Inglehart and 
Welzel [2005] that showed that ‘high levels of economic and physical security 
terms of promoting equality’ (see https://freepolicybriefs.org/tag/gender-inequality-in-
dex/).
15 For further details, see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/. 
16 The methodology of data collection and questionnaire formation are quite strict and 
standardised at the international and national levels so that the comparability among 
countries and between waves is ensured.
17 As happens in surveys, despite our adherence to sampling procedures designed to en-
sure representativeness, the datasets in all waves were slightly biased; accordingly, we 
applied weighting schemes. We used post-stratification weights, based on the structure of 
the population with respect to age, gender, education, and region. The weighting of the 
samples was also undertaken in other participating countries in accordance with the EVS’s 
centrally set methodological rules.
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are conducive to a shift from materialist to post-materialist values – and that this 
shift tends to make people more favorable to important social changes’ [Ingle-
hart, Ponarin and Inglehart 2017: 1314]. Since CEE countries have been undergo-
ing dynamic economic and human development since 1990, we are interested in 
determining whether in the cultural sphere, that is, in the field of value prefer-
ences, these ‘predictable changes’ have been taking place. We monitor whether 
values are changing from traditional to secular-rational and from survival to self-
expression.
Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart [2017] work with both six- and three-item 
indexes of individual-choice norms, which include items measuring the accept-
ance of gender equality on the one hand and the acceptance of divorce, abor-
tion, and homosexuality on the other.18 Given the diversity of meaning among the 
items, we decided to work with two separate categories of indexes: one measur-
ing gender roles at both the individual and the societal level and one measuring 
individual-choice norms. We argue that the gender role items used in the EVS 
questionnaire19 measure attitudes towards gender roles and they do not reflect 
individual-choice norms.20 These indexes were used separately in our analysis 
and we did not entirely follow Inglehart and his colleagues’ analytical strategy – 
they used the six-item index in cross-sectional analyses and the three-item index 
in time-series analyses. 
Results
Post-materialism 
According to Inglehart and Welzel [2005], socioeconomic development is crucial, 
as it has an impact on people’s existential conditions and their perception. They 
argue that socioeconomic development impacted modern societies in two phases: 
(1) industrialisation, which triggered cultural change by means of rationalisation, 
centralisation, bureaucratisation, and secularisation, and (2) post-industrialism, 
which led to an increasing emphasis on individualism, which is to say, an empha-
sis on individual freedom to make decisions about one’s own life and about one’s 
personal development. Post-materialist values are spreading, as is an emphasis 
on individual autonomy. 
To track the evolution of post-materialism, we use Inglehart’s operation-
alisation, which is based on two questions. Respondents are asked to choose the 
18 These three items (acceptance of divorce, abortion, and homosexuality) were used by 
Inglehart and his colleagues in their analysis [see Inglehart et al. 2017].
19 These items are also used in other internationally recognised studies such as ESS, GGS 
or PPA. 
20 See, for example, Beere [1990] or M. van der Horst [2014] for more on gender roles and 
attitudes towards gender roles. 
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first and second most important aims for their countries within the next ten years: 
Maintaining order in the nation, Giving people more say in important government 
decisions, Fighting rising prices, and Protecting freedom of speech. Respondents 
who choose items 2 and 4 indicate are ‘post-materialists’; those who choose 1 and 
3 are ‘materialists’. A ‘mixed’ group captures any other combination. 
In accordance with modernisation theory, we assume that (1) the share of 
post-materialists will gradually increase from 1991 to 2017 in CEE countries and 
that (2) it will remain lower than in Western countries. However, the difference 
should become smaller, as the CEE countries analysed here have become mem-
bers of the European Union and that membership should have an unmistakably 
positive economic and political effect. We can also expect that (3) based on the 
socialisation hypothesis we will observe generational differences in post-materi-
alism in which the youngest generations will be more post-materialistic than the 
oldest one. The distribution of post-materialism is presented in Figure 1. 
As expected, the proportion of post-materialists in the CEE countries was 
low in 1991 and ranged between 4% and 10%, with the lowest value in Hungary 
(4%) and the highest in Poland (10%). In the Western countries analysed, the share 
was higher, from 23% in Sweden to 33% in the Netherlands. However, by 2017 the 
curves considerably differed in the two groups of countries. In CEE countries (ex-
cept Romania), in line with the modernisation theory, we see an increase in post-
materialism: from a moderate level in Slovakia (from 6% to 10%) and in the Czech 
Republic (6% to 13%), to a considerable level in Hungary (17%) and especially 
high in Poland (to 26%). Interestingly, in the CEE countries, the share of ‘mixed’ 
people remained relatively stable (at 55%–60%) between 1991 and 2017, so the in-
crease in post-materialism was at the expense of a reduction in materialism. This is 
also proved by Inglehart’s Percentage Difference Index (PDI), which is calculated 
as the difference between the proportion of post-materialists and materialists. PDI 
values  are shown in Table 3. The higher the value of this index, the higher the 
Figure 1. Share of post-materialists by country 1991–2017 























1991 1999 2008 2017
CEE countries




growth of post-materialists at the expense of materialists. In all the countries the 
PDIs changed significantly between 1991 and 2017: for example, in the Czech Re-
public in 1991 the proportion of post-materialists was 26 percentage points lower 
than the proportion of materialists; in 2017 it was only 13%. In Poland we find that 
this index went from –25% to + 10%, which means that in 2017 the share of post-
materialists outnumbered the share of materialists by 10 percentage points. 
In the Western countries, the trend in the proportion of post-materialists 
was unstable. The main finding, however, is that in the 1991–2017 period the share 
of post-materialists – except in the Netherlands – remained essentially the same 
in these countries, but the trajectories of development were different and fluc-
tuating. In France, Austria, and Sweden (but not in the Netherlands), the share 
of post-materialists dropped in 2008 as a consequence of an economic crisis that 
affected the developed world, during which economic performance fell and un-
employment increased. The theory of post-materialism takes this fluctuation into 
account. Inglehart admits that strong short-term fluctuations in economic devel-
opment (short-term crises) can influence materialistic/post-materialistic attitudes 
[Inglehart 1981]. In these three countries, after 2008, the share of post-materialists 
rebounded in 2017, but it reached only the level observed in 1991. The situation 
in the Netherlands is, surprisingly, completely different. There was a decrease in 
the share of post-materialists, from 33% in 1991 to 18% in 2017. Moreover, during 
the crisis in 2008, the proportion of post-materialists did not decrease but slightly 
increased. We do not yet have an explanation for this trend and neither do our 
Dutch colleagues.21
Interestingly, in the CEE countries the 2008 economic crisis did not de facto 
translate into a decrease in post-materialists (a slight decrease is observed, but 
it is in the standard error range). What is surprising is the big increase in the 
proportion of post-materialists in Poland between 2008 (7%) and 2017 (26%). In 
21 Personal communication by email with Loek Halman on 7 February 2020.
Table 3.  Percentage Difference Index in CEE countries (the share of post-materialists 
minus the share of materialists)
 1991 1999 2008 2017
Czech Rep. –26.3% –15.6% –18.6% –13.2%
Hungary –43.5% –48.1% –25.7% –10.9%
Poland –25.1% –29.3% –30.1% 10.1%
Romania –37.5% –38.1% –34.7% –21.6%
Slovakia –33.3% –41.9% –22.4% –21.9%
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.
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this respect, Poland reached a level comparable with that of Western European 
countries, although its GDP was approximately three times lower in 2017. It is 
likely that the fact that Poles greatly profited from their EU membership, which 
led to an improved standard of living and an overall sense of economic security, 
translated into their post-materialist attitudes. In addition, economic develop-
ment is visible even to the casual observer in Poland: the appearance of cities and 
landscapes has obviously improved since 1991, which might also contribute to 
post-materialist feelings. It is likely that similar processes took place in Hungary, 
where the share of post-materialists had also increased substantially by 2017. 
Compared to Poland (and to some extent Hungary), the share of post-
materialists in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is lower than might have been 
expected given their GDP and HDI levels. This most likely reflects the fact that 
Czechs and Slovaks had high expectations for a rapid increase in their standard 
of living after 1991. Although the standard of living has objectively increased, the 
reference framework for these two populations is the standard of living of their 
neighbouring countries, Germany and Austria (where it is very high). Czechs 
and Slovaks may therefore lean more towards materialism than post-materialism. 
The theory of post-materialism assumes that with the overall humanistic 
development, the proportion of post-materialists in the population will also in-
crease. We examined the data to see if this is the case. We use aggregated data 
from the Human Development Index (see Table 2) and the share of post-material-
ists in the population in 1991 and 2017. The results are shown in Figures 2a and 2b.
In 1991 there was a clear difference between the two groups of countries. 
The R-squared value (0.87) says that the linear model is a good approximation of 
Figure 2a.  Share of post-materialists  
by HDI in 1991 
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
HDI from http://hdr.undp.org/en/data# (see our Table 2) and for the purpose of this 
























































Figure 2b.  Share of post-materialists  
by HDI in 2017
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reality,22 and the model says that as HDI increases the proportion of post-mate-
rialists also clearly increases. The parameters of the regression line say that with 
an increase in HDI by one unit, the proportion of post-materialists will increase 
by 1.9%.
In 2017 the strength of the HDI’s influence on the share of post-materialists 
was lower. Over time, the trend in CEE countries has converged overall with that 
in Western countries  and the linear trend is no longer so clear (the R-squared has 
fallen to 0.33). If we model the relationship between HDI and post-materialism 
with a regression line (which is doubtful in this case), then the linear model says 
that with an increase in HDI by one unit, the proportion of post-materialists will 
increase by 0.9% only. 
Generally speaking, these results could suggest that the pace of post-mate-
rialist growth in the population might tend to slow down once a certain level of 
humanistic development is reached. However, according to Inglehart, we should 
observe the opposite: he predicted in 1990 that as a result of modernisation, ‘oth-
er things being equal, we will witness a long term trend towards post-materialist 
values  as one generation replaces another’ [Inglehart 1990: 87]. However, Figure 
1 shows that this is not the case, since the post-materialist rates in Western coun-
tries remained essentially the same between 1991 and 2017.
In accordance with Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis, are there different 
proportions of post-materialists in the generations defined above? In other words, 
how is the development of post-materialism reflected in generational change? In 
line with the previous delineation, we follow the development of post-material-
ism in four generations separately in each country. Figure 3 presents the cross-
generational differences in post-materialism in each country. 
In the CEE countries (except Poland), in accordance with the theory of so-
cialisation, the youngest generation, Generation Y (1981–2000), had the highest 
proportion of post-materialists in 2017 among all the generations analysed. In Po-
land, it was Generation X (1960–1980). It is also true that in all CEE countries the 
oldest generation, the Veterans (born before 1945), had the lowest proportion of 
post-materialists. However, there are certain differences among CEE countries: in 
Hungary and Poland there was a steep increase in the rate of post-materialism in 
all generations after 1999. In Romania and Slovakia, there was a low and steady 
share of post-materialism in all generations, except Generation Y. In the Czech Re-
public, there was a downward trend in post-materialism in the oldest generation 
and a small (almost negligible) increase among baby boomers and Generation Y. 
As in the CEE countries, in the Western countries the youngest genera-
tion, Generation Y, has the highest proportion of post-materialists (expect in the 
Netherlands), while the oldest generation (Veterans) has the lowest proportion. 
22 We are aware that nine cases (countries) are not an ideal number for a regression analy-
sis. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain more data when we were writing this paper. 
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However, the data for 1991–2017 do not show what Inglehart [1990: 87] suggested 
– namely, differences between the value priorities of individual generations and 
their relative stable positions. Moreover, the data do not reflect the trends that 
he predicted would result from the influence of the economic crisis: he argued 
that after an economic crisis, which leads to a decrease in the proportion of post-
materialists in all generations, the trends return to their original path.23 The only 
country in which post-materialism increased again after the 2008 crisis was Aus-
tria and – but only partly – France. Among CEE countries, this trend applies only 
to Poland and, to some extent, Hungary.
Summing up the above trends in the development of post-materialism in 
terms of modernisation theory, it can be stated that data from CEE countries par-
tially confirm its validity:
(1) With the economic and social modernisation of these countries, the share 
of post-materialists gradually increased, so that the levels were higher in 2017 
than in 1991. However, given the dynamic modernisation of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, as indicated by both GDP and HDI levels, we would expect much 
higher proportions of post-materialists than 13% and 10%, respectively, in 2017. 
(2) In Western countries, despite the economic and humanistic develop-
ment, the share of post-materialists did not increase significantly between 1991 
and 2017, and the values in 2017 were close to those in 1991 (Sweden 23% : 24%, 
Austria 26% : 24%, France 25% : 23%); in the Netherlands it even decreased 
(33% : 18%). The share of post-materialists in CEE countries were on average as 
expected, generally lower than in the Western European countries. However, the 
difference gradually decreased. In 1991, the proportion of post-materialists was 
on average 7% in the CEE countries and 27% in the Western countries – a differ-
ence of 20 percentage points; in 2017, the shares were 15% in the CEE countries 
and 23% in the Western European countries – an 8 percentage point difference. 
23 Inglehart [1990] found this from data that included an economic crisis in the mid-1970s 
(caused by the 1973 oil crisis).
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and 
EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional 
Data 2018. Difference to 100% are those 
who are materialists or mixed. Data for 
Generation Y only for 2008 and 2017 
(no or low number of cases for 1991 and 
1999).
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The big question here is whether measuring post-materialism with a 4-item bat-
tery does not mean that, from a certain level of economic and social/cultural 
development, the shares of post-materialists in the entire population will become 
saturated and stabilise at 25–30% and will never reach a higher level. 
(3) Our longitudinal CEE country data partially confirmed the assumption 
of intergenerational differences. We argue, however, that intergenerational differ-
ences may be due not only to the combination of population turnover but also to 
a period-contextual influence and a change in educational levels.24 The oldest gen-
erations in CEE countries, born before 1945, had the lowest proportion of post-ma-
terialists (except Slovakia), and the proportion in these countries remained more 
or less constant in the 1991–2017 period (Poland is an exception). The youngest 
generation, born in 1981–2000, had the highest proportion of post-materialists (but 
not in Poland). Slovakia behaves differently: the share of post-materialists does not 
differ between generations and there was no increase in the share of post-materi-
alists in the youngest generation between 2008 and 2017, but a decrease – from the 
relatively high level of 20% in the crisis year 2008 to 16% in 2017. 
(4) The question we need to ask over our longitudinal data is whether In-
glehart’s optimism that the trend towards post-materialism in highly developed 
countries is universal, strong, and permanent is valid. Swedish, French, and Aus-
trian EVS data show that even in the youngest generations the level of post-mate-
rialism did not reach above 36% (Sweden; France 30%) Moreover, Dutch data go 
against all modernisation assumptions, because the share of post-materialists in 
all the generations there has been gradually decreasing since 1991 and stabilised 
at approximately 20% in 2017. In 2017 post-materialists outnumbered materialists 
by a mere 5 percentage points in Austria, by 2.5 in France, and by 1.4 in the Neth-
erlands. Only in Sweden was this difference noticeable – at 25 percentage points.
Attitudes towards gender roles
Modernisation theory asserts that human development is associated with cul-
tural shifts, which include, among others, cultural attitudes towards gender roles 
and gender equality. In any society that goes through modernisation based on 
economic development, ‘modernization brings systematic, predictable changes 
in gender roles’ [Inglehart and Norris 2003: 10]. The perception of and attitudes 
towards appropriate male and female roles in the family and society have in re-
24 The expansion of higher education in former communist countries, particularly between 
1999 and 2017, was quite substantial. According to OECD data, the share of the population 
with tertiary education aged 25–34 years rose from 11–14% in the Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, Poland and Slovakia in 1991 to 30–43% in 2017. In Austria, France, the Netherlands, and 




cent decades changed in many countries to such an extent that we could be so 
bold as to talk about a gender revolution. These changes include decreasing sup-
port for a rigid division of labour between husbands and wives, rising accept-
ance of married women’s work, and a certain social pressure for men to increase 
their involvement in tasks traditionally performed by women such as caring for 
children and housework [Kalmijn 2003]. In other words, modernisation has had 
an eroding effect on traditional norms and created space for emerging new ones.
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) maps the effect of new female roles at 
a macro level. As a composite index, it is used to quantify the loss of achieve-
ment within a country that results from gender inequality.25 It ranges from 0 (no 
inequality in the included dimensions) to 1 (complete inequality) [Human Devel-
opment Report 2010]. The GII is interpreted as a percentage and indicates the per-
centage of potential human development lost as a result of gender inequality.26 
The trends in GII between 1995 (the earliest data we have) and 2017 are presented 
in Table 4. 
The table shows that the CEE countries had higher values on the Gender 
Inequality Index in both compared years than the Western countries did. Never-
theless, in all the countries gender inequality decreased between 1995 and 2017, 
25 The index was introduced in the Human Development Report 2010. It uses three di-
mensions to measure opportunity costs: reproductive health, empowerment, and labour 
market participation. The reproductive health dimension has two indicators: the maternal 
mortality ratio and the adolescent fertility rate, which measures early childbearing (teen-
age pregnancy). Empowerment is measured by two indicators: the share of parliamentary 
seats held by each sex and higher levels of educational attainment (secondary education 
and above). Labour market participation is measured by women’s participation in the 
work force.
26 For example, in 2017 the GII was 0.043 in Sweden – indicating a 4% loss in potential hu-
man development due to gender inequality. 
Table 4. Gender Inequality Index in 2000 and 2017 
1995 2017 1995 2017
Slovakia 0.248 0.187 Sweden 0.090 0.043
Czech Rep. 0.252 0.133 Netherlands 0.114 0.044
Poland 0.258 0.128 Austria 0.186 0.078
Hungary 0.322 0.270 France 0.199 0.058
Romania 0.471 0.316
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#.
Note: Countries are ranked according to rates in 1995. In 1995, the lowest value in the 
world was calculated for Sweden (0.090), while in 2017 it was for Switzerland (0.040).
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as envisaged by the modernisation theory. Given that economic development 
(measured by GDP), human development (measured by HDI), and Gender In-
equality (GII) indicate (see Tables 1, 2, and 5) the clear-cut existence of modernisa-
tion trends in CEE countries, we can expect also to see modernisation shifts in the 
domain of gender roles in our survey data.
To track trends in attitudes towards gender roles, we will use several in-
dicators by which this phenomenon is usually measured. The first indicators 
measure conflicting gender roles (traditional vs modern) and look at how these 
conflicts are assessed at the individual level – for example, conflicts that may arise 
between work (public sphere) and the family (private sphere). The items are as 
follows: (1) A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children 
and (2) When a mother works for pay, the child suffers .27 They were measured in the 
questionnaire using a 4-point scale, where 1 means fully agree and 4 means com-
pletely disagree. Figures 4 and 5 present the agreement rate for the two items for 
all countries and waves.28 
The trends in the CEE countries since 1991 went in the expected direction. 
In 1991, the vast majority of the population believed in the dichotomy of work 
versus family – there was a clear preference for the idea that a woman needs a 
family and children: the highest share of agreement was found in Poland (94%); 
27 This question was phrased as follows in 1991, 1999, and 2008 as follows: A preschool child 
is likely to suffer if his or her mother works;, while in 2017 it read: A child is likely to suffer if his 
or her mother works .
28 Not all items were included in all waves. To illustrate development over time, we pre-
sent only those items that were part of all waves. 
Figure 4.  agreement with the statement ‘women really want a home and children’ 
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Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and the EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
This question was not asked in Austria in 1999 and in Sweden in 1991. 
Note: Original 4-point scale. Categories ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’ recoded into ‘agree’. 
The difference to 100% represents those who answered ‘disagree’. Results in percentages. 
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the lowest was in Romania (58%). Until 2017, these shares linearly declined, ex-
cept in Romania and Slovakia, where the decrease had a different trajectory but 
still reached a lower level in 2017 than in 1991. Compared to Western European 
countries, however, CEE shares were considerably higher and by 2017 had still 
de facto only reached the level observed in Western countries in 1991, which is 
somewhat surprising. The most unexpected result is in Poland, where the biggest 
decrease was observed, even though there is a strong political emphasis on the 
family there. It is evident here that in this respect the gender revolution in CEE 
countries still has rather a long way to go.29 
On the other hand, when we look at agreement with the statement ‘the child 
suffers when the mother works’ (see Figure 5), trends in the CEE countries are 
following a path towards gender equality: we see that the relatively high agree-
ment rates in 1991 noticeably (de facto linearly) had decreased by 2017 (except in 
Romania, where the decline was not so straightforward). The feeling that a child 
suffers when its mother works was thus substantially weaker in 2017 than it was 
in 1991 and it had grown closer to the levels in Western countries.30 However, the 
29 We also looked at possible differences in agreement between men and women. For ex-
ample, we found that in 2017, in four countries (Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Poland), women agreed less with this statement than men did. There are no significant 
differences between men and women in the other countries.
30 Again, we checked for possible differences between men and women. The results in 
2017 show that there are differences between men and women: in France or Hungary, 
women agree more than men do that a child suffers when the mother works; in Austria, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia, men agree more than women do.
Figure 5.  agreement with the statement ‘a (preschool) child suffers when mother 











































Czech Rep. Hungary Poland
Romania Slovakia
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
This question was not asked in Austria in 1999.
Note: Original 4-point scale. Categories ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’ recoded into ‘agree’. 
Difference to 100% represents those who answered ‘disagree’. Results in percentages. 
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question here is to what extent the very fact that in the CEE countries, generally 
speaking, families need women to have paid employment in order to ensure a 
certain standard of living of the household is the cause of the recorded disagree-
ment with the statement or whether respondents are really persuaded that fe-
male paid work and child rearing are compatible. The linear downward trend in 
Western European countries in Figure 5 is not surprising and is another indicator 
of the level of gender revolution. 
As both items are part of a more general gender role indicator, we decided 
to combine these two items into an indicator that distinguishes those who adhere 
to ‘traditional gender roles’ from those who embrace ‘modern gender roles’ or 
have ‘mixed attitudes’.31 From a semantic point of view, this index reflects re-
spondents’ attitudes towards a woman’s paid work in the labour market and her 
role in the household. Figure 6 presents the share of those who endorse tradi-
tional gender roles, which is to say, those who think that women should take care 
of the family and not work. In the CEE countries, the proportions of proponents 
of traditional roles were relatively high in 1991 (with a wide range of difference: 
between 83% in Poland and 48% in Romania) compared to the Western coun-
tries, but after 1991 there is an almost linear decline, with a slight slowdown in 
the trend between 2008 and 2017. The drop between 1991 and 2017 is quite con-
siderable. The proportion of proponents of traditional roles in 2017, at 30–45%, 
approached the 2017 rates in the Western European countries, which ranged be-
tween 10% and 30%. An exception to this model is Romania, which started in 
1991 at a relatively low level (at 48%, the lowest level), so the downward trend 
by 2017 was not so steep (34%). Voicu and Voicu [2002] and Voicu [2008] argue 
that the presence of women in the labour market was a common reality dur-
ing the communist regime as the government encouraged women to enter into 
paid employment and provided support for families, and for women especially, 
by ensuring enough childcare facilities. Thanks to this, the gender attitudes of 
Romanians were close to some Western European countries at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The situation changed after the fall of the communist regime when the 
government encouraged the transfer of childcare responsibilities from the state to 
the family and the number of childcare facilities decreased during the transition 
period. Romania, like other CEE countries, still lacks measures that could enable 
women to combine paid employment and a family, such as access to affordable 
childcare facilities and flexible working arrangements. This lack might have led 
to the withdrawal of support for female participation in paid work.
On the other hand, Poland is an example of how socioeconomic modernisa-
tion is reflected in attitude and value changes. The decline of the traditional gen-
31 The exact algorithm for building the indicator is as follows: all those who answered 
‘agree’ to both items were recoded as having traditional gender role attitudes; all those 
who disagreed with both were recoded as having modern gender role attitudes; the rest 




der model in Poland between 1991 and 2017 is breath-taking (from 83% down to 
45%). In Western countries, the differences between countries are also sizable and 
there has been a downward linear trend. In 2017, the share of respondents who 
adhered to the traditional gender role model was the lowest in Sweden (11%) 
and the Netherlands (15%). Austria, at 31%, was close to the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in 2017.32
As far as intergenerational differences in the index of gender roles are con-
cerned (see Figure 7), we made several observations. (1) There are generational 
differences in all CEE countries. The generation born before 1945 has the most 
traditional views, while Generation Y (Millennials) has modern views on con-
flicting gender roles. (2) Czechs and Slovaks have similar generational trajectories 
between 1991 and 2008. In 2017, however, the attitudes of all generations in Slo-
vakia grew closer; the intergenerational gap in the Czech Republic remained un-
changed in 2017, but the linear decline stopped. (3) In Poland, there was a strong 
decline in traditional gender attitudes in all generations in the 1991–2008 period. 
After that, in the two oldest generations, traditional gender attitudes gained 
32 We also checked for differences between men and women. Generally speaking, they 
were relatively small in all the countries and were no greater than 10% [percentage points]. 
In 1991, men in the Czech Republic and France outnumbered women with traditional gen-
der role responses by 9% (Czech Republic) and 7% (France). In 2017, the biggest differenc-
es between male and female respondents were in Austria (10%), Poland (9%), and Sweden 
(8%). In Sweden, the difference was between 15% of men agreeing and 7% of women; in 
Poland it was between 49% of men and 40% of women. The only country in which women 
held substantially more traditional attitudes in 2017 was Hungary, where women were 
more traditional by 7 percentage points (45%:38%). 


























Czech Rep. Hungary Poland
Romania Slovakia
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
Some questions were not asked in Austria in 1999 or in Sweden in 1991. 
Note: Indicator with 3 categories. The difference to 100% represents those who have 
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strength, possibly due to the powerful ideological rhetoric of the ruling Law and 
Justice Party, as it endorses moral values  linked to Polish traditionalism and the 
Catholic Church, which vigorously promotes traditional family values and op-
poses abortion, registered same-sex partnerships, and euthanasia. However, the 
youngest Polish generations maintained the downward trend. A similar pattern 
is found in Hungary. (4) In Romania, in contrast to the other CEE countries, there 
is no clear pattern and all the generations in 2017 moved closer to reaching rela-
tively low values  for traditional gender role attitudes. 
In the Western European countries, the older generations have the highest 
share of traditional gender role attitudes. The two younger generations, with a 
very low proportion of respondents endorsing traditional gender role attitudes, 
are very similar in the Netherlands, Sweden, and France, though not in Austria. 
These results can be understood as an indicator that the Western generations born 
after 1960 have already internalised modern gender role attitudes in employment 
and family. From this point of view, it seems they are completing the gender 
revolution. The fact that female participation rates in the labour market (meas-
ured as the share of the female population aged 15+) in the Western countries 
analysed were gradually increasing in the 1991–2017 period surely contributed 
to this trend – the female employment rate in 2017 ranged between 50% (France) 
and 61% (Sweden). In the CEE countries, the highest female employment rates in 
2017 were in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both about 53%), and the lowest 
was in Romania (48%).
In addition to gender attitudes towards employment and family, we can also 
use a set of indicators capturing attitudes towards gender segregation (gender 
stereotyping) at the societal level. Four items in the questionnaire measure this: 
(1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do; (2) A univer-
sity education is more important for a boy than for a girl; (3) On the whole, men 
make better business executives than women do; and (4) When jobs are scarce, 
men have more right to a job than women. As these items were included only in 
Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and 
EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional 
Data 2018. Data for Austria 1999 and 
Sweden 1991 not collected. Data for 
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(1981−2000)
Sweden
Figure 7.  Traditional gender role attitudes at the country level and by generation 
1991–2017 (%)—second part
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the 2017 EVS survey, we cannot provide the long-term trends. Nevertheless, the 
2017 snapshot is very interesting. Figure 8 shows the distributions. 
Within all these items measuring gender segregation on a societal level, 
there is a clear-cut difference between the CEE and the Western European coun-
tries. The populations of CEE countries have a much higher level of traditional 
gender attitudes (even stereotypes) than the Western countries do. Slovakia and 
Romania appear to be the most traditional, while surprisingly the least traditional 
seems to be Poland. In the Western European countries, there is a very low share 
of agreement with all of these statements; the low numbers in Sweden are very 
surprising. The fact that a significant proportion of respondents in the CEE coun-
tries think that men make better political leaders than women, that men should 
be favoured for jobs in times of high unemployment, and that men are better 
executives than women indicates that at a societal level people’s minds are still 
Figure 8.  agreement with various statements on gender segregation on societal level 
in 2017 (%)
Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
Note: Original 4- or 5-point scale. The columns represent summaries of the response 


















































































































































































































































bound to a gender-stereotype model. It reflects the fact that in these countries, 
there are still few women active in political life and as managers in top positions. 
A much larger proportion of respondents in the CEE countries than in the 
Western European countries agree that men should have priority in getting a 
job when jobs are scarce, suggesting that the breadwinner family model is still 
preferred. The lowest share of agreement is found for the item concerning the 
importance of university education for boys and girls. This view, we think, partly 
reflects the educational expansion in former communist countries (see footnote 
24). Women have begun to study in large numbers at universities and the share 
of women with higher education in the labour market has also increased. This 
indicator raises the question of the relationship between values/attitudes and be-
haviour. Is a relatively low level of agreement with the idea that university educa-
tion is more important for boys than girls a result of many more women studying 
at a university, or is it because attitudes towards girls’ education have positively 
changed within families so girls are motivated and supported to study at a uni-
versity? The expansion of tertiary education that took place in all post-socialist 
countries with various intensity can be regarded as one of the social forces that 
shape values and attitudes.33 Duch and Taylor [1993] point out that each genera-
tion’s experience of education in their formative years impacts their life attitudes 
and values and can be taken as an alternative explanation for intergenerational 
differences in values and attitudes. 
As these and previous analyses show that populations in CEE countries 
are still more conservative in their gender attitudes than populations in Western 
countries, we can assume that there will be a bigger gender gap in CEE coun-
tries than in Western countries. Our results confirm this assumption. Neither of 
the aforementioned indicators exceeded the 10% difference between men’s and 
women’s responses in Western countries, which can be interpreted to mean that, 
at least verbally, men and women do not differ in these populations. In CEE coun-
tries, the situation is different. 
(1) For all indicators, Slovak men significantly more often than Slovak wom-
en (both in statistical and substantive terms) agreed with the above statements 
(the difference between them was in each case greater than 10 percentage points 
and ranged between 13% and 24%). 
(2) Men in all the CEE countries (except Romania) were more likely than 
women to think that men make better political leaders than women do (the difference 
ranged between 11% and 24%). Likewise, in all the CEE countries (including Ro-
mania), men are more likely than women to believe that men make better business 
executives than women do (here the difference ranged between 12% and 21%). 
33 Mannheim [1952] advanced the social force perspective and argued that an individual’s 
formative years form the background to his or her experience of life and the world and 
shape a person’s attitudes and values. 
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(3) The attitudes of men and women do not differ (except in Slovakia) – in 
both the Western and the CEE countries – on the importance of a university educa-
tion for boys and girls. Similarly, there is no difference (again except in Slovakia) 
in the attitudes towards who should have priority in getting a job when there 
is unemployment. On the whole, in all the countries, men and women have the 
same attitudes about  education and work for men and women. In contrast, the 
CEE countries differ from the Western countries on the role of men and women 
in policy and management. As Figure 8 shows, however, gender stereotypes are, 
even in 2017, still much stronger in the CEE countries than in the Western ones. 
Figure 9. Index of gender segregation at a societal level in 2017 (means)
Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
Note: The index encompasses a range of values from 0 to 100, where 0 means no societal 
segregation and 100 means full societal segregation. The Cronbach alpha in all the coun-
tries was at least 0.7. 
 In all the countries, the indicator also points to clear differences in attitudes between 
the oldest and youngest generations (see Figure 10). The youngest generations  


























































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
















Based on these four items, we created an index ranging from 0 to 100, where 
0 means that a respondent has no gender stereotypes on a societal level while 
100 indicates total gender stereotypes. As various indicators reveal, the highest 
values for this gender segregation index are among the respondents from the 
former state-socialist countries (and mainly in Slovakia – see Figure 9); in the 
Western European countries, the average value of the index is below 20, thus in-
dicating very low level of gender segregation, and this is reflected in the Western 
respondents’ responses to all the gender indicators. 
Figure 10. Index of gender segregation at a societal level by generation (means)
Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
Note: The index takes values from 0 to 100, where 0 means no societal segregation and 
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Individual-choice norms 
In this section we deal with individual-choice norms. According to Inglehart, 
three items are indicators of these norms: abortion, homosexuality, and divorce.34 
Respondents in the EVS study are asked whether they find these behaviours can 
be justified (referred to as acceptance further in the text).35 We will not present the 
complete results of each item separately owing to spatial constraints here, but we 
will briefly present the trends, comparing 1991 and 2017 (see Figures 11 and 12). 
There are clear differences between countries with regard to the level of ac-
ceptance of some behaviours. People in Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia 
show the lowest level of acceptance (and in a sense also tolerance) of homosexual-
ity, abortion, and/or divorce both in 1991 and 2017. It suggests that they retain tra-
34 One might argue that ‘divorce’ is no longer a relevant indicator of post-mod-
ernism in the context of partnership behaviour. This objection could be based on 
the fact that countries in Europe have been registering considerably high divorce 
rates since 1991. Moreover, marriage rates have declined over the past three dec-
ades and cohabitation has become an important form of partnership that fre-
quently replaces marriage. However, we believe that in a semantic perspective 
‘divorce’ still symbolises the disintegration of a partnership, whether married or 
cohabitating. Therefore, like Inglehart, we use it in our analysis. 
35 The question was phrased as follows: Please tell me for each of the following whether you 
think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card . The 
items were measured on a 10-point scale, where a value of 1 means never justifiable and 
10 means always justifiable.
Figure 11. Justification of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce
Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.

































ditional attitudes on this dimension of modernity. In contrast, people in Sweden 
and the Netherlands have very high levels of acceptance, which indicates (post)
modern individual-choice attitudes. The Czech Republic, the most tolerant of the 
CEE countries in its views on these behaviours, is similar to Austria and France. 
These three countries are somewhere in the middle, which indicates mild mod-
ern individual-choice attitudes. 
For more a comprehensive picture, we created an index based on these 
three items. Its scale ranges from 1 to 10: value 1 means no support for individ-
ual-choice norms (traditional view) and 10 means support for and tolerance of 
Table 5. Individual-choice norms in 1991–2017 (index means) 
1991 1999 2008 2017 1991 1999 2008 2017
Czech Rep. 4.7 5.6 5.4 6.4 Sweden 5.4 7.6 8.0 8.5
Slovakia 4.2 4.9 4.9 5.6 Netherlands 6.2 6.7 6.5 7.8
Hungary 4.2 3.3 4.6 4.7 France 4.9 5.8 6.1 6.9
Poland 3.1 3.7 3.5 4.3 Austria 4.0 5.3 5.3 6.8
Romania 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.3
Source: EVS integrated 1981-2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. 
Index takes values from 1 to 10 – a value of 1 means no support for individual-choice 
norms (traditional view) and a value of 10 means support for individual-choice norms 
(modern view).
Note: Countries are ranked by means in 2017.
Figure 12.  Regression of the Human Development Index and the index  
of individual-choice norms in 1991 (panel a) and 2017 (panel B)
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Figure 13.  Individual-choice norms index – acceptance – at the country level and by 







































































































































































































































individual-choice norms (modern view). The average values of this index in each 
country and by wave are presented in Table 5. As was the case for individual 
items, we can, logically, observe clear differences between CEE and Western Eu-
ropean countries. People in the CEE countries endorse traditional views (Czechia 
is the exception), while people in the Western countries favour modern views. 
Sweden has the highest support for modern individual-choice norms, while Ro-
mania has the highest support for traditional views. Views in the Czech Republic 
are very close to those in Austria and France. Support for modern individual-
choice norms – in accordance with modernisation theory – increased in all coun-
tries between 1991 and 2017 except Romania, where it slightly decreased. 
Human development, as measured by the HDI, quite clearly intervenes in 
the overall acceptance / non-acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. 
As Figure 12 shows, at the aggregate level, a higher degree of human develop-
ment is also associated with a higher acceptance of these phenomena. This is 
particularly noticeable in 2017, when with each HDI increase of one tenth of a 
point (on a scale from 0 to 1), the index of individual-choice norms increases by 
0.4 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (in 1991 it was 0.2).
As far as the generational differences are concerned (see Figure 13), they 
follow the expected pattern. The older people are (i.e. being a member of an older 
generation), the more traditional the individual-choice norms they support. And 
vice versa: the younger people are, the more modern the attitudes they hold.
Conclusion and discussion
In this exploratory article, we inquired into the effects of modernisation and in-
tergenerational population change on value structures. We based our research 
on Inglehart’s (and his colleagues’) ideas about the relationships between the 
economic and social modernisation of societies and the culture shift conceptu-
Source: EVS integrated 1981-2008 and 
EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional 
Data 2018.
Note: The index takes values from 1 to 
10, where a 1 means no justification  
(traditional view) and 10 means full justi-
fication (modern view). Data for Genera-





























Figure 13.  Individual-choice norms index—acceptance—at the country level and by 
generations in 1991–2017 (means)—second part
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alised as profound changes in people’s value structures. To make our inquiry 
manageable, we focused on three dimensions of cultural shift: the development 
of post-materialism, trends in attitudes towards gender equality, and trends in 
individual-choice norms. An important dimension of our research was also to 
track whether the assumed value changes were in accordance with Inglehart’s 
socialisation hypothesis that in modernising societies the youngest generations 
are primarily the bearers of new value priorities. Thanks to the longitudinal char-
acter of our data, we were able to look at different generations and check whether 
the younger generations in CEE countries, who were socialised and grew up after 
1989 in a time of rapid economic and political changes, show higher levels of post-
modern values than the generations socialised during the communist regime. 
Our basic assumption was that given that the selected CEE countries have 
made relatively rapid progress in political and economic development since 1990, 
by 2017 we should be able to find attitudes and value structures in these countries 
that are relatively similar to ones that have been observed in the Western part of 
Europe. To put it simply, we wanted to see whether the value shifts in CEE coun-
tries have followed the modernisation path and copied the trends observed in 
Western European countries, and to examine whether Inglehart’s modernisation 
theory can be applied to the former communist countries that have been develop-
ing from totalitarian states and command economies into standard democratic 
capitalist societies. 
Does Inglehart’s theory work in CEE countries? The answer is yes and no. 
The affirmative answer covers the assumption of the effects of intergenerational 
population change. In every sphere of cultural modernisation we analysed, i.e. 
post-materialism, gender roles, and individual-choice norms, we found differ-
ences in values and attitudes among generations: the older generations were 
always more traditional in their answers to survey questions than the younger 
generations. This was not only true in the CEE countries; we recorded the same 
trend in the Western European countries. Thus, one important assumption of 
modernisation theory cannot be refuted, which is that as social change (moderni-
sation) progresses, new value preferences – resulting from generational replace-
ment – will prevail, while the original preferences will begin to fade away with 
the outgoing generations. 
As for the assumption that with socioeconomic modernisation come higher 
shares of post-materialism, more gender-egalitarian attitudes, and stronger sup-
port for individual-choice norms, the results are not so clear-cut. We saw that in 
the CEE countries, in line with modernisation theory, there was only a moderate 
increase in post-materialism between 1991 and 2017 in Slovakia (from 6% to 10%) 
and in the Czech Republic (6% to 13%), a considerable increase in Hungary (from 
4% to 17%), and a large increase in Poland (from 10% to 26%).� The exception was 
Romania, where the share of post-materialists remained low (from 7% to 10%). 
Nevertheless, the shares of post-materialists in the CEE countries in 2017 were 
still much lower than the shares in the Western countries, where they ranged 
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between 18% and 24% in 2017. However, in the Western countries, the trend in the 
proportions of post-materialists was unstable between 1991 and 2017 and the key 
finding is that the shares of post-materialists – with the exception of the Nether-
lands – remained essentially the same. In the Netherlands, the data indicate that 
level of post-materialism even decreased in the studied period by almost a half 
(from 33% to 18%). 
The results for the Western European countries present an interesting find-
ing: although the Western countries we analysed are among the most developed 
in the world, the share of post-materialism in these countries has not increased 
over the last 25 years, even though the indicators of socioeconomic development 
point to improvement. This raises an important question: Is the way that post-ma-
terialism is measured valid? Does the method of measurement suggest that, after 
a certain level of socioeconomic development, higher levels of post-materialism 
are not identified and the relationship between socioeconomic development and 
post-materialism loosens and is no longer valid? Figure 2b would strongly sup-
port this conclusion. 
In the CEE countries, we found the predicted trend in attitudes towards 
the issues indicating gender equality. From 1991 to 2017, the initially very high 
proportions of people found to express traditional and gender-stereotypical atti-
tudes de facto linearly decreased towards gender equality attitudes. Here, there-
fore, socioeconomic and value developments are moving in the expected direc-
tion. However, even in 2017, the CEE countries were far from reaching the level 
of gender-equality attitudes recorded in Western countries. In the Western coun-
tries, there was a linear decline in traditional gender attitudes in the 1991–2017 
period, but the starting point in 1991 was already much lower than in the CEE 
countries. With a little exaggeration, we could even say that in 2017 the CEE coun-
tries reached the point where the Western countries had set out from in 1991. It is 
evident that in the CEE countries the gender revolution is still in progress. From 
a generational point of view, the survey data indicate that Western generations 
born after 1960 have already internalised modern gender-role attitudes and have 
thus more or less completed the gender revolution.
Within individual-choice norms indicated by attitudes towards homosexu-
ality, abortion, and divorce we found – as with gender attitudes – clear differenc-
es between the CEE and the Western European countries. Although the support 
for modern individual-choice norms increased in all the CEE countries between 
1991 and 2017 (except in Romania, where it slightly decreased), we still find that 
people tend to endorse traditional views (the Czech Republic is the exception). 
Among the Western countries, Sweden had the highest support for modern indi-
vidual-choice norms in 2017. In this sphere of modernity, there seems to be a clear 
pattern: the more advanced countries are in terms of human development, the 
more they support individual-choice norms.
How should we understand our overall results? When we started our analy-
sis, we expected to find considerable differences in attitudes and values between 
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East and West in 1991. This was confirmed. We also assumed that by 2017 the 
value differences between the Eastern and Western European countries would 
decrease and that there would be some convergence. That did not happen. We 
must agree with Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart [2017: 1317] who warned that 
‘…in short, when a society attains high levels of existential security and people 
grow up taking survival for granted, rapid cultural changes can occur—but this 
happens with a multi-decade time lag between when secure conditions emerge 
and new norms predominate’ . Even though the EVS has data covering a quarter 
of a century, it seems that that is still not enough time for the value structures of 
the former communist and the traditional democratic countries to draw closer 
together. It is true, as we have confirmed, that there are cultural differences be-
tween generations in societies. But a substantive change requires enough time 
for the attitudes and values of new generations to prevail in society. We agree 
with Esmer’s [2007: 86] assertion that modernisation has indeed had an impact 
on values ‘in a predicted direction, but the magnitude and occasionally even the 
direction of the influence will depend on cultural heritage’. Cultural legacies 
change through both intergenerational replacement and historical period influ-
ence. Savelyev [2016] has demonstrated that the post-materialist values observed 
in CEE countries (and not only) are determined more by both cohort replace-
ment and within-cohort effects. Whether in CEE countries this involves intergen-
erational replacement or historical period influence must yet be demonstrated 
in further analyses. We argue that it is a combination of both intergenerational 
replacement and historical period influence. 
Inglehart and Bakker [2000] were aware of this, noting that modernisation 
does not necessarily mean the homogenisation and convergence of cultures be-
cause cultural legacies have a role in the process. It is also important to bear in 
mind the fact emphasised by Diez-Nicholas [2002], who claim that new values 
are usually supported by the elites much sooner than they are by the masses 
(measured, for example, by education). We deliberately did not take this phe-
nomenon into account in our analysis because it would have enormously in-
creased the length of the paper. However, in a different analysis of long-term 
trends in EVS data we did register the effect of education. For instance, Fučík, 
Chromková Manea and Rabušic [2019] studied the normative aspect of mother-
hood and found that the share of agreement with the need for a woman to have 
children within the Czech female population decreases with increasing levels of 
education in all waves: the higher the level of education, the lower the proportion 
of agreement with the need for women to have children. This trend goes hand in 
hand with the importance of education for women and the influence of educa-
tion on the emancipation and life aspirations of women. For men, this the trend 
was noticeable only in 1991; it was irregular in other waves and the difference be-
tween educational categories was not very large (except for 2017). Matejková and 
Chromková Manea [2019] checked for differences in preferred work attributes 
(external and internal) by education level in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
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found that people with a university education (regardless of gender) are more 
likely to prefer internal work characteristics, such as the opportunity to use one’s 
initiative at work, the possibility to achieve something, and responsible work. 
These internal work attributes and their preference in the population are typical 
for Western countries and suggest a post-materialist interpretation accompanied 
by economic, political, and social development. 
In our paper, we found that the Western and Eastern European countries 
we compared still differ in their value preferences – in some cases less, in others 
more – even though they are all members of the EU and are part of a globalisation 
process that should contribute to value homogenisation. In this light it is neces-
sary to ask an important question: � Which of the two theses of modernisation will 
be fulfilled over time – the classical one, which presupposed the convergence of 
industrial societies, or the opposite one formulated by Shmuel Eisenstadt [2000], 
who claims that modernisation development is moving towards ‘multiple mo-
dernities’, i.e. modernities that ‘do share some common characteristics but that at 
the same time they develop great differences between them – not just local varia-
tions, but indeed differences with respect to the core characteristics of modernity’ 
[Eisenstadt 2006: 199]. We cannot provide a clear answer at present. However, our 
results offer partial support for the classical theory of increasing similarity be-
tween CEE and Western countries. At the same time, however, we believe that in 
2026, when a new wave of EVS data will be collected, it will be possible to present 
empirical evidence showing the direction in which the modernisation of CEE 
countries has headed: whether towards the value convergence of the Eastern and 
Western parts of Europe and towards the efforts to build a common European 
Union identity, or towards multiple modernities, in which collective identities 
are continually reconstructed in relation to the new global context [Eisenstaddt 
2000: 21]. 
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